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Abstract—This paper studies the resource allocation problem
for a heterogeneous network (HetNet) in which the spectrum
owned by a macro-cell operator (MCO) can be shared by both
unlicensed users (UUs) and licensed users (LUs). We formulate a
novel hierarchical game theoretic framework to jointly optimize
the transmit powers and sub-band allocations of the UUs as
well as the pricing strategies of the MCO. In our framework, an
overlapping coalition formation (OCF) game has been introduced
to model the cooperative behaviors of the UUs. We then integrate
this OCF game into a Stackelberg game-based hierarchical
framework. We prove that the core of our proposed OCF game is
non-empty and introduce an optimal sub-band allocation scheme
for UUs. A simple distributed algorithm is proposed for UUs to
autonomously form optimal coalition formation structure. The
Stackelberg Equilibrium (SE) of the proposed hierarchical game
is derived and its uniqueness and optimality have been proved.
A distributed joint optimization algorithm is also proposed to
approach the SE of the game with limited information exchanges
between the MCO and the UU.
I. INTRODUCTION
A HetNet is a multiple tier network consisting of co-located
macro-cells, micro-cells and femto-cells. It has been included
in Long Term Evolution Advanced (LTE-A) standard as a
part of the next generation mobile network technology. One
of the motivations driving the development of HetNets is its
potential to improve the spectrum utilization efficiency by
reusing the existing frequency bands. Due to the scarcity of
radio resources, it is important to find an efficient method to
improve the network capacity with the limited radio resources.
The femto-cell is introduced to improve coverage of the
cellular network as well as quality of service (QoS) of indoor
mobile subscribers. The femto-cell which is controlled by a
lower power BS covers a small area and provides radio link
to its own subscribers. As the deployment of the femto-cells
is made by the consumers, centralized control is generally
difficult to achieve. Game theory provides useful tools to
study distributed optimization problems for multi-user network
systems. Various game theoretical models have been proposed
to distributedly optimize the spectrum sharing between femto-
cells and existing cellular network infrastructure [1], [2]. In
[1], the authors modeled the distributed interference control
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problem as a non-cooperative game and discussed the im-
pact of different pricing schemes on the performance of the
spectrum sharing network. By using Stackelberg game model,
a pricing based approach to handle the interference control
problem was proposed in [3], where a sub-band pricing scheme
is introduced to regulate the received power at the BS for
the code division multiple access (CDMA) communication
system. However their assumption that all UUs can only access
one communication channel may not always hold in practical
scenarios.
In this paper, we consider a special HetNets in which the
spectrum licensed to an MCO can be shared by mulitple co-
located femto-cell base stations (BS). The femto-cell BSs try
to make the best use of the spectrum offered by the MCO.
The users subscribed to the service of the MCO are regarded
as the LUs who have the priority to access the resources of
the MCO. The users subscribed to the femto-cell service are
UUs and can only share the sub-bands owned by the MCO
under the condition that the resulting interference to the LUs
should be maintained below a tolerable level. The sub-band
allocation of each UU is controlled by its corresponding femto-
cell BS. In the latest LTE-A system, the CA is introduced
to support wide-band high-speed transmission by allowing
multiple users to aggregate their radio resources together [4]
[5] [6]. Hence, we assume that each femto-cell BS can allocate
multiple contiguous or non-contiguous sub-bands for each
of its UUs and enabling the carrier aggregation. We also
assume each sub-band can be accessed by multiple users at
the same time. We formulate the sub-band allocation problem
as an overlapping coalition formation game (OCF-game). In
this game, a coalition is formed by the UUs who access the
same sub-band. Since each UU can access multiple sub-bands,
two or more coalitions may contain the same UU. In other
words, the coalitions formed by UUs can be overlapped. The
performance of each UU not only depends on the sub-band
allocation scheme but also its transmit power used to send
signals in different coalitions.
We integrate the OCF-game into a hierarchical game frame-
work to investigate the interaction between the MCO and the
UU. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work which
integrates the OCF-game model into an hierarchical game
framework to the analyze of HetNets.
It is knowing that allowing overlapping among multiple
coalitions will significantly increase the complexity of the
game problem. Specifically, finding a stable coalition forma-
tion structure of an overlapping coalition formation game is
2Fig. 1. A spectrum sharing multi-tier HetNet in which the spectrum is owned
by the macro-cell and shared with other tiers.
notoriously difficult and generally requires to exhaustively
search all the possible structures. In this paper, we however
show that it is possible to find the core of our proposed game
under this spectrum-sharing-based HetNet without exhaustive
searching. The main contributions of this paper are summa-
rized as follows:
1) A spectrum-sharing based HetNet is considered in which
the femto-cell BS can aggregate multiple sub-bands of the
MCO and allocate aggregated sub-bands to support high-
speed wide-band data transmission for each UU. This is
different from our previous work [7] [8] where each UU
is assumed to only access one sub-band.
2) The OCF-game model is applied to study the scenario that
the cooperative UUs can dedicate their power resources
to multiple sub-bands.
3) The non-emptiness of the core of our proposed OCF-
game is proved, which makes the optimization of the
coalition formation structure possible.
4) A hierarchical game framework is established to study
the joint optimization of transmit power and sub-band
allocation of UUs as well as the pricing strategy of the
MCO.
5) Numerical results are presented to analyze the impact of
power constraint, number of users, number of available
sub-bands on the performance of HetNets.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section
II introduces the related works. Section III introduces the
system setup. Section IV presents the problem formulation.
Section V gives the game theoretic analysis and Section VI
presents the distributed algorithm and Section VII shows the
numerical results. Section VIII concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORKS
An important problem in a spectrum-sharing based network
is how to give sufficient protection to the LUs of the MCO. The
interference power constraint [9] is usually applied to regulate
the spectrum sharing between UUs and LUs. In this case the
Stackelberg game can be a useful tool to model the interaction
between the MCO and the UUs. In [1] and [3], the MCO acts
as the leader and has the priority to set a price to access the
radio resource, and the UUs act as followers and will decide
their best transmit powers based on the prices. These works
show the usefulness of using Stackelberg game model in solv-
ing interference control problem with hierarchical structure,
which motivated us to include the Stackelberg game into our
hierarchical game framework. However the assumption that
all UUs can only access one communication channel with
flat-fading may not always hold in practical scenarios. In our
previous work [7], we focus on the case that the spectrum
owned by the MCO is divided into sub-bands, while these
sub-bands can be shared with the UUs. A non-cooperative
game model to enable the UU to sequentially join the sub-
bands while the interference to the MCO is controlled by a
pricing mechanism. The limitation of this solution is that the
sub-band and UUs can only be one-to-one paired so frequency
reuse among UUs is not considered.
The carrier aggregation (CA) is proposed to support high
peak data rate in LTE-A standard [10]. The CA technique
[5] [6] is the process of aggregating different blocks of
under-utilized spectrum into larger transmission bandwidths
to support high data rate. The technical challenges in the
implementing CA have been discussed in [4]. Motivated from
the concept of CA, we consider the scenario that the UUs
can share the sub-bands with selected UUs. In [11], a similar
system setup has been considered, and a heuristic algorithm
is reported to achieve the Nash equilibrium of the proposed
game. This work, however, only considers non-cooperative
competition between UUs. In this paper, we propose a general
hierarchical game theoretic framework that allows cooperation
among UUs in a distributed fashion.
The game theory based resource allocation has also been
used to study the coordination of the BSs on sub-carrier
selection and interference management [12], [13]. In [12], the
authors proposed a BS cooperation policy for nearby BSs to
pick up suitable component carriers to perform CA, therefore
the inter-cell interference is mitigated. In [13], the authors
analyzed the coexistence problem of macro-cell BS (primary
user) and femto-cell BS (secondary user) from a cognitive
radio point of view. A series of techniques, such as adaptive
power transmission, non-cooperative and coalitional game, is
introduced to give the solution to the interference management.
However, in this paper we consider the coordination between
the UUs rather than the BSs, which is a challenging task as
the mobility and more population of the UUs than the BSs.
In [14] the authors studied the cooperation problem between
cellular subscribers located at the middle and boundary of
each cell. They found that carefully constructing pair-wise
coalitions between middle and boundary nodes by allowing
the middle nodes to relay the packets of boundary nodes can
significantly improve the overall performance of the network.
In [15], the rate allocation problem for Gaussian multiple
access channels was investigated. The authors proved that it
was possible to find an unique allocation, which always lies in
the core of the game. In [8] the authors studied the cooperative
behavior of secondary users in a two-tier spectrum sharing
cognitive network where both the Stackelberg game and non-
3overlapping coalition formation game were combined to build
a hierarchical game framework. A joint solution was given
to the sub-band allocation and interference control problem.
Although the coaltional game has been widely used to study
the problems in wireless communications, most of the existing
works only allow users to form disjoint coalitions. In practical
communication systems, allowing overlapping of coalitions
can further improve the performance [16]. For example, one
mobile subscriber may cooperatively transmit in two different
sub-bands with two different subscribers. However, so far only
limited works have been reported to apply the overlapping
coalitional game to analyze cellular networking systems. In
[17], the authors studied how small cell BSs coordinate with
each other to achieve efficient transmission. By allowing the
femto-cells to form overlapping coalitions to jointly schedule
the transmission of their subscribers, they found that the
performance of mobile nodes near the cell edge was improved.
The key difference of the proposed work comparing to the ones
mentioned above is that, we adopt a new OCF-game model
which enables each player to join multiple coalitions.
III. SYSTEM SETUP
Consider an orthogonal frequency-division multiple access
(OFDMA) based two-tier network where the spectrum owned
by an MCO is divided into M sub-bands each of which
can be accessed by multiple UUs controlled by the femto-
cell BSs as illustrated in Fig. 1. We denote the set of sub-
bands as B and the set of femto-cell BSs as K. Here the
concept of underlay borrowed from the cognitive radio which
means that each secondary user (i.e., UU) is allowed to access
the spectrum of primary users (i.e., LUs) which can tolerate
limited interference from the UUs [18]. In this paper, we
consider frequency selective fading, i.e., channel fading in
different sub-bands is interdependent. We assume the channel
state is time-invariant and can be regarded as an constant
within the duration of each time slot. We further assume that
the mobile devices are equipped with multiple antennas and
hence can transmit over multiple sub-bands at the same time.
Furthermore, multiple UUs are allowed to share the same sub-
band with each LU. We perform the system analysis using
numerical calculations and the simulation is running on Matlab
platform.
Each femto-cell BS can apply multiple sub-bands to support
services for UUs, i.e., each sub-band can be accessed by the
UUs from more than one femto-cell BS. We assume that in
each time slot there is only one active UU Sk connected with
femto-cell BS k. Let hmk be the channel gain between Sk and
the macro-cell BS receiver in sub-band m, and gmkj be the
channel gain between Sk and jth femto-cell BS. Let pSk =
[p1Sk , ..., p
M
Sk
] be the power allocation vector of UUs, where
pmSk = 0 implies that sub-band m is not used by Sk. Table I
lists the notations and symbols used in this paper . Multiple
femto-cell BSs can apply for the same sub-band at the same
time. We denote the set of all UUs as S. We denote the set of
UUs utilizing the same sub-band m as Lm, i.e., Lm = {Sk :
pmSk > 0, ∀Sk ∈ S. Lm = ∅ means no UU uses sub-band m,
Lm = {Sk} means sub-band m is exclusively occupied by
femto-cell BS k, and |Lm| ≥ 2 means sub-band m has been
shared by two or more femto-cell BSs.
Different from the previous works which consider the dis-
tributed spectrum-sharing scheme [11], UUs can cooperatively
transmit the signal with co-channel peers to further improve
their pay-offs. In this paper, we follow the same line as [19]
and assume that UUs from different femto-cells sharing the
same sub-band m can cooperate by forming a virtual |Lm|-
input |Lm|-output MIMO channel [19].
In this paper, we consider the following two power con-
straints:
- Interference power constraint in each sub-band m,
K∑
k=1
pmSkh
m
Sk
≤ Q, (1)
where the maximum tolerable interference Q is deter-
mined by the macro-cell BS to protect the LUs.
- The transmit power cap of the mobile devices,
M∑
m=1
pmSk ≤ p, (2)
where pmSk is the transmit power of Sk on sub-band m
and p is the the total amount of power that can be used by
each UU Sk to transmit signals. The value of p¯ depends
on the physical limits of the hardware as well as the
battery life.
Remark: These two power constraints together limit the
number of UUs accessing each sub-band. For example, if p
and hmSk are large, UU Sk may cause interference that is close
to Q so that it will be the only active UU in sub-band m. If
p and hmSk are small, multiple UUs can simultaneously access
the same sub-band, and the accumulated interference is still
below Q. The number of sub-bands used by an individual UU
is affected by the power cap given in (2), but the total number
of the active UUs in each sub-band is limited by the maximum
tolerable interference level constraint in (1).
The interference power constraint reflects the fact that the
randomly distributed UUs usually give different levels of
interference to each macro-cell BS. Due to the frequency
selective fading, the interferences from the same UU are
generally different in different sub-bands. Hence the UUs are
preferred to transmit in those frequency bands with weak
channel gains between the UUs and the macro-cell BS.
TABLE I
THE NOTATIONS
piSk (pSk ,µ) pay-off function of UU Sk
v(pm, µm) value function of partial coalition m
lSk sub-band allocation vector of UU Sk
µ interference price vector
hmSk
channel gain from UU Sk to macro-cell BS in
sub-band m
pm
Sk
transmit power of UU Sk in sub-band m
gmi,j the ratio of the channel gain between UU i and BS j
to the interference power at k in sub-band m
λmSk
the pay-off division factor for UU Sk in sub-band m
P the power allocation matrix of all UUs
4An important problem is how UUs can distributedly form
different coalitions to improve their pay-offs. We formulate an
overlapping coalition formation game to study this problem.
In this game, UUs can behave cooperatively to coordinate
their actions. Hence the coalition formation game focuses on
solving the following two questions: Q1) how the coalition
members coordinate with each other, and Q2) how a coalition
formation structure can be established among UUs.
To answer the first question, the virtual MIMO technique
is used as the cooperation scheme among the UUs in the
same coalition for two reasons: 1) it is shown to achieve
the upper-bound of the rate for a multiple access channel
[20], 2) it is shown to satisfy the proportional fairness [8].
More specifically, the UUs in the same sub-band m form a
coalition and cooperate with each other to transmit and receive
signal. Using the virtual MIMO technique, we can convert the
communication within one coalition into a virtual Lm-input
Lm-output channel, which follows the same line as [20] and
[8]. Therefore the capacity sum of all UUs in the mth virtual
MIMO channel is obtained as,∑
Sk∈Lm
rSk =
∑
Sk∈Lm
log (1 + λmSkp
m
Sk
), (3)
where λmSk is the kth non-zero eigenvalue of matrix
GT{Sk∈Lm}G{Sk∈Lm} where G{Sk∈Lm} is the channel gain
matrix of UUs in the same sub-band. For example, if
{S1, ..., Sn} are in the same sub-band m, then the matrix is
given by
G{Sk∈Lm} =


gm11 g
m
12 ... g
m
1n
gm21 g
m
22 ... g
m
2n
. . . .
. . . .
gmn1 g
m
n2 ... g
m
nn

 . (4)
In the above matrix, gmjk =
gm′jk
σm
k
, where gm′jk is the channel
gain between UU Sj and femto-cell BS k, and σmk is the
received interference power at BS k in sub-band m. We will
give detailed analysis and propose a distributive algorithm to
answer the second question in section V.
To simplify the analysis, let us consider the uplink transmis-
sion. In the uplink, the receiver of macro-cell BS is interfered
by the transmit signals of UUs. Therefore there is only
one leader when it applies price-based interference control.
However, our model can be directly extended to the downlink
scenario. In the downlink case, multiple LUs act as a group of
leaders which can cooperatively decide the interference price
in each sub-band. The main objectives of this paper are to
solve the following problems:
1) Power control problem: investigating how the MCO
controls the interference power to protect the LUs by
dynamically adjusting the interference price.
2) Sub-band allocation problem: investigating how the UUs
choose the sub-bands to access based on the channel
information, the interference price and the action of other
UUs.
3) Overlapping Coalition formation problem: investigating
how the UUs form overlapping coalitions to improve their
data rate.
We formulate a hierarchical game framework to jointly
optimize the above three problems.
IV. THE HIERARCHICAL GAME FORMULATION
The interaction between the macro-cell BS and femto-cell
BS can be modeled as a Stackelberg game. Furthermore,
we also formulate a OCF-game to investigate the coopera-
tion among the femto-cell BSs, where their UUs can form
coalitions to improve the performance. We assume that the
transmission of femto-cell and macro-cell are synchronized.
Our goal is to jointly solve the power control problem of
the LUs and resource allocation problem of the UUs. Firstly,
there is a trade-off between the capacity sum of the femto-cell
network and QoS of the macro-cell. If the UUs transmit with
high power, they will get high data rate but generate more
interference to the macro-cell BS. Since sufficient protection
to the LUs should be guaranteed in the first place, the MCO
should regulate the behavior of the UUs. We can model this as
a power control problem for UUs. Secondly, given the limited
spectrum and power resources, we should consider how the
UUs can cooperate with each other to allocate the sub-band
and optimize their transmit power.
We model a hierarchical game consisting of the two sub
games. In the proposed game model, the MCO and femto-cell
BSs are the players. The way the players play the game is
defined as actions. In the proposed game model, the action of
the MCO is to decide the interference prices, and the actions
of the UUs are to decide which sub-bands to access and how
much power should be allocated to each of these sub-bands.
We apply the Stackelberg game to model the interaction
between the MCO and the femto-cell BSs. In the proposed
Stackelberg game, the leader is the MCO and the correspond-
ing LUs and the followers are the femto-cell BSs who control
the UUs. Let us follow a commonly adopted game theoretic
setup [1] [21] [22] to define the pay-off of Sk as,
πSk(pSk ,µ) = rSk(pSk)− cSk(pSk ,µ), (5)
where cSk(pSk,µ) =
∑M
m=1 µ
mhmSkp
m
Sk
is the cost function.
Furthermore, since Sk can simultaneously access multiple sub-
bands, it aims to maximize the sum of the pay-offs obtained
from all the active sub-bands under the constraints given in
(1) and (2).
The MCO collects the payment from all the UUs occupying
the sub-bands. We define the pay-off functions of the MCO
as,
πMCO(pSk ,µ) =
Sk∑
k=1
cSk(pSk ,µ). (6)
The main solution for our proposed hierarchical game is
the Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) which is formally defined as
follows: [23],
Definition 1. For a fixed sub-band allocation, the pricing
vector µ∗ = [µ∗1, ..., µ
∗
M ] and the transmit power p∗Sk =
[p1∗Sk , ..., p
M∗
Sk
], k = 1, ...,K , form a SE if the interference
5Fig. 2. The hierarchical game structure.
power constraint in (1) is satisfied, and for any m ∈
{1, ...,M} and k ∈ {1, ...,K}, we have
µ∗m = arg max
µm≥0
πMCO(p
∗, µm, µ
∗
−m) (7)
where µ−m means all the MCO except for m. For any given
price µ, p∗ is given by
p∗Sk = arg maxpSk≥0
πSk(pSk ,p
∗
−Sk). (8)
The structure of the hierarchical game is illustrated in Fig.
2. The MCOs can adjust their prices to maximize the pay-
off defined in (6). We will show that the optimal price is
specified by the dynamics of the interference from the CA in
each sub-band. The femto-cells BSs can cooperate and self-
organize into coalitions each of which consists of member
UUs to coordinate the transmission to improve the sum of
the pay-offs. On the femto-cells BS side, they cooperate and
self-organize into coalitions, in which their member UUs can
coordinate their transmission to improve the sum of pay-off.
A. The pay-off of UU
Suppose that the overlapping coalition formation structure
is fixed. Each Sk having already obtained a fixed λSk , we can
write the payoff of each UU Sk as
πmSk(p
m
Sk,
, µm, λmSk) = log (1 + λ
m
Sk
pSk)− µ
mhmSkp
m
Sk
. (9)
The optimal power allocation of Sk is obtained by solving
the following optimization problem,
Problem 1.
max
pSk
πSk(pSk ,p−Sk ,µ,λSk)
S.t.
M∑
m=1
pmSk ≤ p.
In the proposed Stackelberg game framework, the maximum
tolerable interference in (1) is omitted in Problem 1 because
it is included in the interference µm and thus is autonomously
satisfied. Hence we only need to consider the constraint in (2).
Problem 1 can be directly solved by using the standard
convex optimization approaches and the resulting optimal
transmit power for UU Sk in sub-band m is given by,
p
m†
Sk
= arg max
pm
Sk
≥0
πmSk(p
m
Sk,
, µm, λmSk) (10)
=
(
1
µmhmSk
−
1
λmSk
)+
. (11)
We write p†Sk = [p
1†
Sk
, p
2†
Sk
, ..., p
m†
Sk
]. Due to the power cap
constraint in (2), the final power allocation will fall into the
following two cases:
Case 1.
∑M
m=1 p
m†
Sk
≤ p. In this case, Sk can access all sub-
bands under the constraint defined in (2). The power allocation
of Sk is decided by constraint in (1). Hence we can remove
(2) and the power allocation of the UU solely depends on
the sub-band prices. Each of the UUs tries to solve (9) for
the optimal power allocation and obtain pm†Sk to maximize the
pay-off.
Case 2.
∑M
m=1 p
m†
Sk
> p¯. In this case, only selected sub-bands
can be accessed by the UU Sk. More specifically, the solution
is achieved by searching a sub-set Ni ⊂ M such that the
following condition is satisfied:∑
m∈Ni
π(pm†Sk ) ≥
∑
n∈Nj ,j 6=i
π(pn†Sk), (12)
where {Nj} denotes the set of all possible sub-sets of M
except Ni. This case implies that once the price is fixed, the
number of sub-bands accessed by one UU is bounded by the
power cap constraint, and obviously we have
∑
m∈Ni
p
m†
Sk
≤ p.
In either cases, we can obtain the optimal power allocation
of Sk:
p∗Sk = {p
m∗
Sk
,m = 1, 2, ...,M.},
pm∗Sk =
{
pm†, if m ∈ Ni
0, otherwise. (13)
The corresponding sub-band allocation indicator is,
l∗Sk = {l
m∗
Sk
,m = 1, 2, ...,M.},
lm∗Sk =
{
1, if l∗Sk > 0,
0, otherwise. (14)
From the results above, it can be observed that the optimal
solution of the transmit power only depends on the values of
µm and λmSk . The prices are decided by the MCO through
its interaction with UUs, and λmSk is obtained from coalition
formation structures of UUs. In rest of this section, we discuss
how to obtain optimal µm and λmSk .
B. The pay-off of the MCO
The MCO can use the prices µ charged to the UUs to
control the interference in each sub-band. We will show
that the MCO can maximize its pay-off by adjusting the
prices based on the dynamic of the aggregated interference
at the macro-cell BS receiver. Hence the proposed algorithm
greatly reduces the communication overhead and makes the
distributed power allocation approach possible.
The revenue gained by the MCO by sharing sub-band m is
given by:
πMCO(p
m, µm) = µm
K∑
k=1
hmSkp
m
Sk
. (15)
6Hence the MCO tries to find the optimal sub-band price to
maximize its revenue in each sub-band under the maximum
tolerable interference constraint.
Problem 2.
max
µm
πMCO(p
m, µm) (16)
s.t.
K∑
k=1
pmSkh
m
Sk
≤ Q. (17)
pmSk ≥ 0. (18)
Substitute (11) into Problem 2, we obtain,
Problem 3.
max
µ
K∑
k=1
(
1
hmSk
−
µm
λmSk
)+
hmSk (19)
s.t.
K∑
k=1
(
1
µmhmSk
−
1
λmSk
)+
hmSk ≤ Q, (20)
Using standard convex optimization approach to find the
optimal µm in above problem requires the MCO to obtain
global information of the UUs. Fortunately, Problem 3 has a
nice property that the objective and constraint functions both
monotonically decrease with µm. Hence if we assume the
power cap constraint is satisfied, then the objective function
will be maximized when the constraint in (20) takes equality.
Note that the left side of (20) is the aggregated interference
received by macro-cell BS in sub-band m. Therefore the MCO
can optimize price µm and affect the aggregated interferences
to the upper bound.
V. COALITION FORMATION GAME ANALYSIS
In this section, we first define the coalitional game and
imputation, and then analyze the game properties to prove the
existence of the core.
Definition 2 ([24], Chapter 9). A coalition C is a non-
empty sub-set of the set of all players K, i.e., C ⊆ K. A
coalition of all players is referred as the grand coalition K.
A coalitional game is defined as (C, v) where v is the value
function mapping a coalition structure C to a real value v(C).
A coalitional game is said to be super-additive if for any two
disjoint coalitions C1 and C2, C1∩C2 = ∅ and C1, C2 ⊂ K, we
have,
v(C1 ∪ C2) ≥ v(C1) + v(C2). (21)
Given two coalitions C1 and C2, we say C1 and C2 overlap if
C1 ∩ C2 6= ∅.
Definition 3. A pay-off vector pi is a division of the value
v(C) to all the coalition members, i.e., pi = [πS1 , · · · , πSK ].
We say pi is group rational if∑Kk=1 πSk = v(C) and individual
rational if πSk ≥ v({Sk}), ∀Sk ∈ C. We define an imputation
as a pay-off vector satisfying both group and individual
rationalities.
If a coalitional game satisfies the supper-additive condition,
all the players will have the incentive to form a grand coalition.
However if the supper-additive condition does not hold, then
the grand coalition will not be the optimal solution for all
players. In this case, the players will try to form a stable
coalition formation structure in which no player can profitably
deviate from it. In the proposed OCF-game, for each possible
prices of the MCO, we focus on finding optimal coalition
formation structure, for UUs to share the spectrum of the
MCO.
When overlapping is enabled among coalitions, the coali-
tions are no longer disjoint sub sets of the player set as defined
in the non-overlapping coalitional game. In the OCF-game, the
concept partial coalition is utilized:
Definition 4. The partial coalition is defined as a vector pm =
(pmS1 , p
m
S2
, ..., pmSK ), where p
m
Sk
is the fractional resource of Sk
dedicated to coalition m. Note that pmSk = 0 means Sk is
not a member of the mth coalition. A coalition structure is a
collection P = (p1, ...,pM ) of partial coalitions.
Remark 1. In a non-overlapping coalition formation game, a
coalition is just a subset of the player set. For a player set of
size N , the number of coalition formation structures is given
by the Bell number BN , where BN =
∑N−1
k=0
(
N−1
k
)
Bk is the
number of possible coalition structures and Bk is the number
of ways to partition the set into k items.
For example, for a game with two players S1 and
S2, the possible partitions can be written as {S1, S2} or
{{S1}, {S2}}. However, in OCF-game the concept of partial
coalition not only specifies who joins each coalition, but also
indicates how much resource each player will allocate to each
coalition. If the resource is continuous, there are generally an
infinite number of partial coalitions. It means that the concept
of coalition can be regarded as a special case of the partial
coalition, where each player joins only one coalition with all
its resource.
Definition 5. An OCF-game is denoted by G = (K,M,P ,v),
where
- K = {1, 2, ...,K} is the set of players which are the
femto-cell BSs.
- M = {1, 2, ...,M} is the set of sub-bands.
- P is the power allocation matrix, where the row pSk =
(p1Sk , p
2
Sk
, ..., pMSk) represents how player Sk assign its
power on different sub-bands, and the column pm =
(pmS1 , p
m
S2
, ..., pmSK ) represents the power each player con-
sumes for sub-band m. pm = (pmS1 , pmS2 , ..., pmSK ) also
corresponds to a partial coalition.
- v(Cm) : Rn −→ R+ is the value function, which
represents the total pay-off of a partial coalition Cm.
Definition 6. We define a game to be U-finite if for any
coalition structure that arises in this game, the number of
all possible partial coalitions is bounded by U .
Fig. 3 illustrates an example of the overlapping coalition
formation of our model. The spectrum of the MCO is divided
into six sub-bands {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} which can be allocated to
three mobile devices {M1,M2,M3}. A coalition is formed
7Fig. 3. The illustration of the overlapping coalitions in our proposed game.
on the sub-band if it is accessed by two or more mobile
devices. Each mobile device may belong to multiple coalitions,
since it may access multiple sub-bands at the same time. We
say the coalitions containing a common member player are
overlapping. For example, in Fig. 3, we denote the coalition
formed by the devices accessing sub-band k as Ck, Then
we have, C1 = {M1}, C2 = {M1,M3}, C3 = {M3},
C4 = {M1,M2,M3}, C6 = {M2,M3}, C5 = ∅. Hence, C1,
C2 and C4 overlap with each other since C1 ∩ C2 ∩ C4 = M1.
Similarly, C3 ∩ C4 ∩ C6 = M2 and C2 ∩ C4 ∩ C6 = M3.
The sum rate achieved by forming coalition is given by (3),
and the pay-off sum of UUs equals to the sum rate minus the
payment to the MCO. Hence the value function of the partial
coalition pm is defined as the pay-off sum on sub-band m.
Given the fixed price vector µ, the value function of the partial
coalition pm is given by,
v(pm,λm) =
∑
Sk∈Lm
rSk −
∑
Sk∈Lm
µmhmSkp
m
Sk
. (22)
It is proved in [8] that the pay-off division among coalition
members satisfies the proportional fairness [25] and if the
benefit allocated to each member equals to its contribution
to the overall rate in sub-band m, i.e.,
rmSk = log (1 + λ
m
Sk
pmSk). (23)
The solution of the optimal power vector pmSk of Sk is given
by (13), which is a function of λmSk and µm. Since µ is
imposed by the MCO, the UUs can optimize their pay-off
sum by choosing proper sub-bands to access. Furthermore,
since λmSk is decided by the coalition structure, finding sub-
band allocation will directly affect the payoff of each UU.
There are two types of actions of the players in an OCF-
game, which are the coalitional action and the overlapping
action. The former defines how the resource being allocated
among the member players in one coalition, and the latter
defines how resources being allocated between players in
the overlapping parts of multiple coalitions. These are the
key features to differentiate the OCF-game from the non-
overlapping coalition formation game.
In the proposed system setup, the femto-cell BSs whose
UUs are accessing the same sub-band form a coalition. The
cooperation among the member players is achieved by forming
a virtual MIMO channel. The pay-off division relies on
assigning λ to the players, which can be considered as the
contribution of each coalition member to the sum rate. Since
the UUs can join multiple coalitions, the proposed game
becomes an OCF-game. The resource of a UU is the total
transmit power. The UUs need to allocate its transmit power
in each sub-band properly for maximizing the pay-off. For the
proposed OCF-game, we have the following definition.
Definition 7. For a set of UUs S, a coalition structure on S
is a finite list of vectors (partial coalitions) P = (p1, ...,pM )
that satisfies (i) ∑Kk=1 hmSkpmSk ≤ Q, (ii) suppm ⊆ S for all
m = 1, ...,M , and (iii) ∑Mm=1 pmSk ≤ p for all j ∈ S.
The power allocation matrix also indicates the utilization
status of sub-bands. The constraint (i) states that the transmit
power of UU in each sub-band is bounded, (ii) states that the
overlapping coalition is a subset of the grand coalition, and
(iii) states that the sum of transmit power is upper bounded.
Proposition 1. The proposed OCF-game is 2K-finite.
Proof 1. See Appendix A.
The above result suggests that it is possible to reduce the
number of possible coalition formation structures into a finite
set.
We are interested in investigating a stable coalition structure
which optimizes the pay-off sum. Following the same line in
[26], let us define the core of the OCF-game for the sub-bands
allocation,
Definition 8. For a set of players I ⊆ K, a tuple (PI ,piI) is
in the core of an OCF-game G = (K,v). If for any other set
of player J ⊆ K, any coalition structure PJ on J , and any
imputation yJ , we have pj(CJ ,yJ ) ≤ pi(CI ,piI) for some
player j ∈ J .
Theorem 1. [26] Given an OCF-game G = (K,v), if v is
continuously bounded, monotone and U-finite for some U ∈ N,
then an outcome (CS ,pi) is in the core of G iff ∀S ∈ N ,∑
j∈S
pj(CS ,pi) ≤ v
∗(S), (24)
where v∗(S) is the least upper bound on the value that the
members of S can achieve by forming the coalition.
Proposition 2. The core of the proposed OCF-game is non-
empty.
Proof 2. : See Appendix B.
Since enabling overlapping in the coalition formation game
will significantly increase the complexity of the game, the
overlapping coalition structure is sometimes unstable as there
may exist cycles in the game play. For example, let us consider
a network system with three UUs S1, S2 and S3, and two
sub-bands l1 and l2. We denote πSj [m|Si] as the pay-off
obtained by Sj when it forms coalition with Si on sub-
band m, and πSj [m|∅] is the pay-off obtained by Sj when it
8exclusively occupies m. Initially, since πS1 [l1|∅] > πS1 [l2|∅],
πS2 [l2|∅] > πS2 [l1|∅] and πS3 [l2|∅] > πS3 [l1|∅], S1 joins
l1, S2 and S3 join l2. However, if we assume the following
statements hold for the three UUs, 1) πS1 [l2|S2] > πS1 [l1|S3]
and πS1 [l1|S2] > πS1 [l2|S3], 2) πS2 [l1|S3] > πS2 [l2|S2]
and πS2 [l2|S3] > πS2 [l1|S2], 3)πS3 [l1|S1] > πS3 [l2|S2],
πS3 [l2|S1] > πS3 [l1|S2], then we can easily observe that the
game play of the coalition formation will be stuck in a cycle.
To avoid this situation, a history of the coalition structure is
maintained in the proposed algorithm. If a rotation is detected,
it will be removed from the coalition formation flow.
VI. COORDINATION PROTOCOL DESIGN AND
DISTRIBUTED ALGORITHM
In this section, we discuss the protocol design of the UUs’
coordination and distributed algorithms which can reach the
coalition structure in the core of the coalition formation game
and the SE of the hierarchical game.
A. The Protocol Design for Coordination of UUs
To implement the proposed algorithm into more practical
systems, we consider the MAC protocol in this section.. We
have the following assumptions:
• We follow the same line as in [27] to introduce the
following distributed coordination scheme among UUs.
More specifically, the UUs accessing the same sub-bands
perform in-band communication with each other, both
control packets and data packets are transmit in the same
channel, hence there is no need for a dedicated control
channel.
• We follow the same line as in [8] and [28] and assume
that the channel gain between each UU and femtocell BS
is the same in both forward and backward directions.
• We assume that the channel gain can be regarded as a
constant within one time slot. Each time slot consists
of the duration for control packets exchange and data
packets transmission.
We introduce two control packets, request-to-send (RTS)
and clear-to-send (CTS), for UUs sharing the same sub-band
to exchange their identity and establish coordination links
with each other. Each control packet also contains the address
information of the transmitter so the UU can identify the
source of the packet. Each UU can extract the channel gain
information from its received control packet.
Step 1) The channel gain estimation and neighborhood discover-
ing:
a) Firstly, the femto-cell BSs broadcast the RTS packet
to all the UUs for them to estimate the channel gain.
b) Each UU can then utilize the control packets for the
in-band neighbor discovering and channel gain in-
formation exchange. For example, UU Sj sends gm′jk
and gm′jj to UU Sk in sub-band m. Upon receiving
the information sent by Sj , Sk will then send back
a CTS packet containing gm′kj and gm′kk to Sj . Hence
Sj knows that Sk is also accessing sub-band m as
well as the channel gain information.
Step 2) Coalition formation:
a) After the channel estimation and neighbor discover-
ing, the UUs need to calculate and negotiate the pay-
off division factor λmk . Since the channel gain and
neighborhood information is obtained in previous
step, each of the UUs can construct GSk∈Lm and
subsequently calculate λmk . The assignment of λmk
to each UU Sk could be random or follow some
policies [8]. Here we assign the λmk following the
rank of channel gains. Suppose the pay-off division
vector λm is sorted in ascending order [λm1 , ..., λmK ].
The UU Sk has already obtained the channel gain
gm′jj , j = 1, ...,K in step 1). Sk sorts the channel
gain in ascending order and finds the rank value rSk
of gm′kk . Then it picks the rSk th element in λm as its
pay-off factor, i.e., λmk = λm[rSk ].
b) Based on the pay-off division factor λmk and price
µm broadcast by the MCO, the UUs estimate their
pay-offs and decide to accept or reject the current
coalition structure. If all the UUs are satisfied, go
to Step 3). If at least one UU is not satisfied, it will
proposed a new sub-band allocation which makes the
current coalition structure invalid. Then go to Step
1-b).
Step 3) Data transmission:
After a stable coalition structure (i.e., sub-band and power
allocation) is obtained, each UU starts data transmission
with the optimal power calculated from (13). Note that
the duration of data transmission should be less than the
channel coherence time.
In each iteration, each of the ULSs will negotiate with K−1
other ULSs in a single sub-band. Considering there are K
ULSs and M sub-bands, we can see that the time complexity
is O((K − 1)KM).
we consider the communication overhead of the proposed
protocol at the worst case. If we assume the size of the control
packets in the proposed protocol is v bits, then the overhead
for channel gain estimation and neighborhood discovering is
at most [K + 2(K − 1)]v bits. For the negotiation part, in
each iteration there are at most [(k − 1)KM ]v bits are sent.
Recall that the coalition structure is proved to be 2n-finite,
hence searching the core requires at most 2K − 1 iterations.
Therefore, in the worst case, the communication overhead will
be [(2K − 1)(k − 1)KM + 3K − 2]v bits.
B. Distributed Algorithm
To reduce the number of iterations, we can use the similar
way to that in [8] to drive the feasible region of the sub-band
price µj , which is given by µj ∈ [0, µ]. Let v be the upper
bound of vSk and h be the lower bound of |hjk|2, then we
have µ = v
h
.
Algorithms I and II are proposed to find the SE of the hierar-
chical game. For any given Q, p pair and the channel gains, the
algorithms achieve the SE which contains a stable overlapping
coalition structure and an optimized power allocation for each
UU. We have the following proposition about the SE of the
game.
9Algorithm 1 OCF Algorithm for Sub-band Allocation
Step - 1)Sensing:
a) The UUs, after receiving the prices of available sub-bands
from the MCO, sequentially send a short training message
to estimate their pay-off in all the sub-bands when the
sub-bands are exclusively used by Sk.
b) Each Sk broadcasts the sub-band combination l∗Sk that
maximizes its pay-off sum,
l∗Sk = [l
(1)
Sk
, l
(2)
Sk
, ..., l
(n)
Sk
]. (25)
Let R∗ = {l∗Sk : Sk ∈ {1, ...,K}}.
Step - 2) Negotiation:
a) All the active UUs need to negotiate with each other on
each of the sub-bands in R∗ to obtain the possible pay-off
division factor λmSk .
b) After the negotiation process, Sk solves problem (1)
based on the new set of λmSk , and obtains a new sub-
band allocation to maximize its pay-off. Then Sk updates
and broadcasts its optimal sub-bands allocation. Step 2)
is repeated until no UU wants to change its occupied
sub-bands.
Algorithm 2 Distributed Interference Control Algorithm
Definitions: At iteration t, let
- µm(t) be the pricing coefficient of sub-band m,
Step - 1) Initialization:
- Set µm ≥ µ, ∀m ∈ {1, 2, ...,M}.
- Set ǫ > 0 to be a small positive constant.
Step - 2) Price Adjustment:
a) At iteration t, MCO updates and broadcasts µ(t) = (1−
ǫ)µ(t− 1).
b) Each Sk senses the sub-bands and negotiates with other
active UUs in the same sub-bands to determine the sub-
band allocation lm∗(t) and power allocation pm∗(t).
c) All active UUs repeat Step 2-b) to update their opti-
mal sub-bands, and the outcome is a coalition structure
Pm(t).
d) The MCO monitors the aggregated interference in each
sub-band. If Nj > Q, the price adjustment in sub-band j
stops. If Nj ≤ Q, go to Step 2a).
Step - 3) Termination:
The algorithm ends with solution µ∗ = µ(t−1),P ∗ = P (t−
1) in which the element pm∗Sk (µ
m∗) is given by (13).
Proposition 3. The price µm always converges to a non-
negative value if a non-negative power allocation for a given
p and Q pair exists.
Proof 3. : See Appendix C.
From propositions 2 and 3, we conclude that, for any given
p¯ and Q, the proposed algorithms will converge to the SE
of the hierarchical game. The simulation results provided in
section IV support this claim.
Remark 2. The hierarchical game works as follows. At the
Fig. 4. A time frame of proposed algorithm.
beginning of iteration, the MCO broadcasts the price µ to
all UUs in its coverage area. Each UU decides its optimal
transmit power and sub-band based on the received pricing
information sent by MCO. Once all UUs have made the
decisions, MCO will adjust the price based on the interference
before going to the next iteration.
The proposed algorithms can be implemented in a dis-
tributed manner. On the MCO side, it does not need to inquire
any information from the UUs, e.g., the interfering link gain
hmSk or corresponding transmit power p
m
Sk
. It just measures
the aggregated interference at its receiver in each channel,
and adjusts the price accordingly. On the UUs side, with the
channel price and the link gain information measured with in
a coalition, they can easily derive the potential pay-off gained
by joining different coalitions. Therefore each of them can
choose the best profited coalition combination to take part in.
Considering the time overhead, for information exchange
between the MCO and the UUs, there is a need for only one
dedicated channel for the MCO to broadcast the interferences
prices. The implementation is illustrated in Fig. 4. A time
frame for data transmission can be divided into two phases:
the power control phase and the data transmission phase. In the
power control phase, the time is divided into several time slots,
which corresponds to an iteration in the proposed interference
control algorithm. In each time slot, the MCO first measures
the interference it is suffering, then adjusts the interference
prices in each sub-band. Upon receiving the interference
prices, the UUs re-allocate their power in each sub-band based
on the prices and the measured mutual interference. After
several iterations when the prices and power allocation are
stable, each of the ULSs uses its power allocation in the last
time slot to perform data transmission. Suppose the price and
power allocation will converge after L time slots, each time
slot duration is τ , and the data transmission time is t, then the
time overhead of the proposed algorithm should be t
Kτ+t .
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section we investigate the performance of the pro-
posed hierarchical game framework in the spectrum-sharing
based femto-cell network. To better illustrate how to apply
proposed algorithm adapts to various network environments,
we consider the network system under different sets of inter-
ference and power constraints, as well as different numbers of
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Fig. 5. Convergence performance. p = 50, Q = 2. The curves illustrates
the convergence of the interference prices in an 8 sub-bands network.
UUs K and available sub-bands M combinations. The result
shows that the proposed algorithm can automatically fit the
constraints no matter which one dominates or both of them
jointly apply.
Fig. 5 illustrates the convergence of interference in a net-
work with 8 sub-bands, with p = 50 and Q = 2. In Fig.
5, the trend of the curves shows that the prices converge at
around hundreds of iterations. Furthermore, it is noted that
the prices in each sub-band converge at the similar speeds.
This is because the prices of MCO directly control sub-band
allocation and the power allocation of UUs. Finally, the price
charged to different sub-bands are independent with each
other, which coincides with the definition in (18).
In Fig. 6, the convergence rate of average prices under
different Q value is provided. An interesting observation is
that, under the same power cap constraint, the convergence
speed in the case of large Q is generally much faster than that
in the case of small Q. This phenomenon can be explained
as follows: with the increase of Q, each UU will allocate
more power in each sub-band, hence under a fixed power
cap constraint, each UU can access less sub-bands. Under
tour setting, accessing less sub-bands is equivalent to join less
coalitions. Hence, a large Q reduces the chances for UUs to
join many coalition, which result in a reduced complexity for
coalition formation, and thus the time cost on forming a stable
coalition structure can be significantly reduced.
Figs. 7 to 8 show the convergence rate of the sub-band
prices as well as the pay-offs of the MCO and UUs network.
The tested network contains 64 UUs and 128 sub-bands, with
p = 100. Fig.7 compares the pay-offs of the MCO versus
the interference and power constraints. Assuming the channel
coefficients are fixed, we increase one constraint while fixing
the other one. It is observed that at the beginning of each
time slot, the pay-offs increase with the constraint before
they become steady. The reason for this is that initially the
interference constraint is much tighter, which becomes the
main limitation of the transmit power. However, when the
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Fig. 6. Convergence performance of the price under different Q, p = 100.
The curves shows the impact of Q on the convergence speed.
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Fig. 7. The impacts of varying the interference constraint: the pay-off sum
increases with Q.
interference constraint becomes larger, the transmit power
is then jointly limited by both interference and power cap
constraints. Finally when the interference constraint becomes
very loose, the transmit power is limited by the power cap
constraint so the system performance becomes stable.
Fig. 8 illustrates the choice of interference limit Q against
the average price µ over all sub-bands. The average price µ
generally reflects the how much interference LUs can tolerate.
It is observed that the price at Q = 10 is higher than that
at Q = 50. This shows that the price decreases with the
value of Q. Generally speaking, the less the value of Q, the
rarer the resource is, so the price is accordingly larger. More
specifically, it is obvious that the larger the Q, the larger the
possible transmit power of UU. If we look at the optimal
power solution pm∗Sk =
(
1
µmhm
Sk
− 1
λm
Sk
)+
, we can see that
pm∗Sk decreases with µ
m
, hence in sub-band m, a larger transmit
power pm∗Sk results in a smaller interference price µ
m
.
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Fig. 9. Comparison of Q = 10 and Q = 50. The number of active UUs
versus the number of sub-bands.
Figs. 9 to 12 investigate the impact of the number of
available sub-bands on the payoffs of UUs. Fig. 9 and 10
shows the number of active UUs and the number of coalitions,
under different numbers of sub-bands respectively. It is seen
that the number of active UUs is always lower than the total
number of UUs. The reason is that if the channel gains of some
UUs are highly correlated, the low payoff UUs will always be
forced to leave the coalition. From Fig. 9, it is observed that
in general the larger Q the more active UUs, because larger Q
enables more chances for the UU to transmit. Fig. 10 shows
that the more available sub-bands the more coalitions formed,
because when overlapping is enabled, the number of coalitions
will be limited by the number of available sub-bands.
Fig. 11 and 12 shows the average number of coalitions
each UU joins and the average prices of sub-bands versus
the number of sub-bands. Fig. 11 shows that the UU tends
to join multiple coalitions when the number of available sub-
bands increases, because in this case the players with lower
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Fig. 10. Comparison of Q = 10 and Q = 50. The number of coalitions
versus the number of sub-bands.
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Fig. 11. Comparison of Q = 10 and Q = 50. The average number of
coalitions one UUs join against the number of available sub-bands.
pay-off in a crowded coalition may be better-off if joining a
new coalition. Fig. 12 presents that the sub-band prices tend
to decrease with the number of available sub-bands. When the
UUs access multiple sub-bands, the aggregated interference in
a single sub-band will be lower, which resulting lower sub-
band prices. Another observation is that the price at Q = 10 is
higher than that at Q = 50 because the tolerated interference
is low when Q is small. Therefore the price is accordingly
higher.
Figure 13 compares the proposed OCF algorithm with the
traditional coalition formation setting without overlapping. It
is illustrated directly in the figure that the improvement of
data rate by enabling overlapping. When the power available
for transmit goes high, the UUs in OCF scheme are benefited
by exploring more chances to transmit on multiple sub-bands
while in the CF schemes each of the UU can only access a
single sub-band.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
The sub-band allocation and the power control issues in the
carrier-aggregation-enabled HetNet are studied in this paper.
We have developed a hierarchical game framework to jointly
solve the power and sub-band allocation problems under the
constraints of the transmit power and maximum tolerable
interference level. We established a Stackelberg game for
MCO to regulate the transmit power of the UUs so as to give
sufficient protection to the LUs while optimizing the pay-off
of the UUs. We also apply OCF-game to analyze the behavior
of the UUs that can self-organize into overlapping coalitions.
We have proposed a simple two-layer algorithm to let the UUs
iteratively search for the optimal coalition structure and the
power allocations under different prices imposed by the macro-
cell. It has been proved that the proposed algorithm can always
converges to the SE of hierarchical game and at the same
time the resulting transmit power and the sub-band allocations
are stable and no players can further improve their payoff
by unilaterally deviate from it by acting alone. Furthermore,
by allowing the overlapping in the coalition formation among
UUs,, we have addressed the problem of sub-band and power
allocation problem under two dimension constraints. The
proposed framework can also be extended into more general
network setting with multiple BSs to cooperatively share their
sub-bands or the downlink communication that multiple LUs
need to be protected.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Suppose a partial coalition pm∗ = {pm∗Sk : k = 1, 2, ...K}
is formed on sub-band m, in which the positive power pm∗Sk is
given by (13), i.e.,
pm∗ = argmax
pm
π(pm). (26)
We define the support of pm∗ as,
supp(pm∗) = {Sk : pm∗Sk > 0, k = 1, 2, ...K}
m, (27)
which defines a coalition of UUs regardless the resource
distribution. Hence, for any other partial coalition pm′ with
the support supp(pm∗), we have
π(pm∗) ≥ π(pm
′
), (28)
i.e., the partial coalition pm∗ blocks all other partial coalitions
formed on sub-band m which involves with supp(pm∗).
Therefore, we can say that the partial coalition pm∗ in our
proposed game is one-to-one correspondent to the coalition
{Sk : pm∗Sk > 0, k = 1, 2, ...K}
m formed on sub-band m.
Since {Sk}m ⊆ K, i.e., {Sk}m is a subset of K, the number
of all possible partial coalitions equals to the number of subset
of K, which is given by,
K∑
n=1
(
K
n
)
= 2K − 1. (29)
This concludes the proof.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
1) Continuous. The value function in (22) is the difference
between a log function and a linear function, which is
obviously continuous.
2) Monotone. The interference power constraint in (1) limits
the total transmit power allocated in sub-band m indi-
rectly by pricing in the Stackelberg game. Hence the
power allocated by Sk in sub-band m is bounded by pm∗Sk .
Since the pay-off function, π(pmSk), of Sk is concave, then
for any π(pm′Sk ) ∈ [0, p
m∗
Sk
] we have π(pm′Sk ) ≤ π(p
m∗
Sk
).
Therefore for any pm′ and pm∗, such that pm′Sk ≤ p
m∗
Sk
,
we have v(pm′) ≤ v(pm∗), i.e., the value function is
monotone.
3) Bounded. According to the proof in 2), the value function
is bounded by v(pm∗), where pm∗ = (pmS1 , p
m
S2
, ..., pmSK )
satisfies
∑K
k=1 h
m
Sk
pmSk = Q.
4) U-finite. The proof can be referred to proposition 1.
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5) The inequality. The equality of (24) is always taken in the
proposed game since the value function is the summation
of individual pay-off of the member players.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
In previous section we proved that finding optimal pric-
ing using µm∗ = argmax
µm
πMCO(p
∗, µm) is equivalent to
solving
∑K
k=1
(
1
µm∗hm
Sk
− 1
λm
Sk
)+
hmSk = Q. Hence the pay-
off maximizing for MCO can be achieved by choosing the
optimal price to control the interference approaching Q. In
other words, the only two cases that the MCO will stop further
increasing or decreasing prices are, 1)∑Kk=1 pmSkhmSk ≤ Q, and
2) µm = 0. In other words, the price µm can always converge
to a fixed price.
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